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Introduction
What associations are and whether they help to democratise authoritarian rule or support those in power is the subject of a long-standing and controversial debate. 1 The roles that associations play are of utmost importance for those interested in democratic change in autocracies, who pin their hopes on associations as harbingers of democracy. This paper explores the roles of associations in countries under authoritarian rule, drawing on experiences from 1 Research for this publication was funded by the German Research Foundation (project number and carried out between 2013 and 2016 in cooperation with Algerian, Mozambican, and Vietnamese scholars. Algeria, Mozambique, and Vietnam. These three "post-socialist" countries are located in world regions exhibiting a high density of authoritarian rule: North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, and Southeast Asia. Despite many differences, the three countries are rather similar in a number of respects. All three had given up rather traditional Marxist-Leninist and socialist ideals by the late 1980s. Moreover, the three countries have become market-oriented economies but have not developed into Western-style democracies. Rather, the political systems in the three nations are structured in one way or another in an authoritarian manner. Finally, in all three countries the state has remained influential or in a strong position vis-à-vis associa-
tions. Under such conditions, can associations contribute to democratisation?
One school of thought would answer this question in the affirmative. Starting with the French political thinker and historian Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859), associations have many times been portrayed as "schools of democracy" -where citizens learn and practise democratic ideas and acquire civic virtues -or sometimes even as "bulwarks of democracy" (Hyden 2010: 253) . However, such propositions have also encountered a fair deal of criticism.
Contemporary critics include Edwards and Foley (1996) or Roth (2004) , who point to the "dark sides" of associations -for example, authoritarian intra-organisational decisionmaking processes. Others have turned Tocqueville's ideas upside down and claim that associations are or at least can be supporters of autocracies. Giersdorf and Croissant (2011: 5) , for example, argue that associations are "amphibian bodies" which link society and the state. If autocratic regimes succeed in co-opting their leaders, associations are turned from challengers into defenders of existing regimes (ibid.). Social movement activists in Egypt similarly critiqued the behaviour of associations there during the 2011 uprising. Their criticisms, which basically said that these organisations were imposing restrictions on themselves in terms of their activities, if not aligning themselves with the regime, echoed comments on the worldwide "NGOization" of associations (Carroll and Sapinski 2015: 3-4) . Since the 1980s, the latter critique goes, many associations (especially NGOs) have developed into specialised policy consultancies and/or service providers. While such organisations formerly denounced conservative societies and authoritarian rule, their increasing closeness to the state and to national and international donors has been accompanied by a decline or an outright loss of their critical impetus (Bebbington 2008; Glasius and Ishkanian 2014) . 2 Arguably, then, the "dark side" of associationalism -as demonstrated, for example, by the elitist behaviour of middle-class associations spearheading people's power putsches in Thailand and the Philippines in the early part of this century -cannot be easily disentangled from their "bright side," which includes the development of civic virtues (see Giersdorf and Croissant 2011: 5) .
Divergent assessments of associations also exist in the scholarly literature on Algeria,
Mozambique, and Vietnam. On the one hand, scholars claim that Vietnamese associations, especially local NGOs working as service providers, are "apolitical" and closely connected to, if not befriended with, the state (Thayer 2009; Wischermann et al. 2015: 28) . With respect to Algeria, Liverani (2008) even portrays middle-class secular associations there as supporters of the authoritarian regime. His research provides support for Jamal's (2007) argument, echoing Witkorowicz (2000) , that in the Arab World associations should be seen as a pillar which voluntarily or involuntarily reinforces authoritarianism. Turning to Mozambique, Pereira portrays associations there as weak, overstretched, capital-centric, and illequipped to be a serious challenger to the ruling party (Pereira 2011: 2) . Moreover, where the state invites Mozambican associations to provide expertise and to participate in policyformulation processes, they are co-opted and captured through pseudo-democratic procedures, with their actors left disillusioned in the end (Fiege 2014: 132) .
On the other hand, Bui Hai Thiem (2013) sees Vietnamese associations as contesting power and representing ideas and values in governance about democratic freedoms, transparency, accountability, and meaningful participation. He argues that associations "serve as fundamental platforms for the changing dynamics of governance in Vietnam" (ibid.: 93).
Concerning Algeria, Cavatorta (2015) detects no sustained impact of associations on the current political system. Nevertheless, he suggests that in the near future these organisations might "be the building blocks of a new type of activism that can emancipate itself from the subordination which it suffers at the moment" (ibid.: 7). According to him, scholars should focus on groups and associations which may now seem marginal and powerless, but will in the near future "be the ones that will force broader political change" (ibid.: 9). Finally, Fiege (2014) sees Mozambican associations as beginning, against all odds, to have an impact on the government in terms of opposing corruption, the sale of land, and the exploitation of resources. According to Fiege (ibid.: 133) , Mozambican associations also constitute an important voice against the re-militarisation of societal conflicts.
Cavatorta (2013) offers a way out of the controversy surrounding associationalism. He recommends shedding teleological thinking and normative presumptions and joining Berman, who proposes that associations "should not be considered an undisputed good, but a politically neutral multiplier -neither inherently 'good' nor 'bad', but dependent on the wider political environment and the values of those who control it" (Berman 2006: 266) . Cavatorta (ibid.: 3) also suggests conceptualising the relationship between an authoritarian state and society as interdependent and exploring associations and their activities in relational ways.
In a similar way, Froissart (2014: 220) emphasises "an interactive and relational conception of state power to demonstrate not only how popular protests are being 'absorbed' by authoritarian states […] but also more fundamentally how the very modes of wielding power are being reconfigured." She argues that "authoritarian regimes last in parts thanks to certain forms of discontent" and "the way they are expressed is an integral part of authoritarian governance" (ibid.: 219, italics in the original). Cavatorta and Froissart realise that whereas political environments can influence associations, these organisations are also part of this en- In the following we first present the theoretical framework of the research project from which the data presented in this paper derive and also address some methodological issues.
Thereafter we present the most important empirical findings. In the penultimate section we discuss what these findings imply concerning the question of whether associations in Algeria, Mozambique, and Vietnam help to maintain and/or weaken authoritarian state power. In the conclusion we summarise the main findings.
Theoretical Foundations and Methodological Issues
Our understanding of authoritarianism follows Stenner (2005: 16-20) , who argues that authoritarianism repudiates individual self-determination and autonomy and strictly negates the supremacy of the individual over a group or a system. Authoritarianism consists of an ensemble of attitudes and ways of acting that link the uncompromising denial of difference and diversity with an unconditioned demand for homogeneity and uniformity. This in turn leads to coercive action towards and suppression of people who are "different." Examples of authoritarianism can be found in organisational practice and in discourses. Authoritarianism involves -a lack of tolerance of others and of views that diverge from one's and the group's own, as well as a strict rejection of pluralism;
-the rejection of difference and an insistence on sameness and the prioritisation of the group over the individual as well as of group interests over those of the individual ("groupiness");
-the personal coercion of and bias against people who are (ethnically, politically, morally)
"different" as well as political demands for authoritative constraints on their behaviour (i.e. forms of state coercion);
-structures and mechanisms that ensure the prioritisation of the group over the individual as well as group interests over those of the individual. Such structures and mechanisms are accepted because they help to achieve uniformity, or are even actively supported because they are viewed as prudent principles for guiding social and political development. (Stenner 2005: 14-20) Collective and individual self-determination and autonomy are also at the core of our understanding of democracy. More specifically, autonomy is the fundamental democratic ideal of a deliberative understanding of democracy and "describes the essential meaning of democratic self-rule.
[…] Autonomy means that individuals -both individually and collectively -hold their interests with due consideration, and are able to provide reasons for holding them" (Warren 2001: 62) . Accordingly, in the area of intra-organisational decision-making and the three policy fields we focus on (see below) we explore whether associations, in a general sense, support the development of citizens' individual and collective self-determination and autonomy and/or whether they stand for the negation of such self-determination and autonomy -a state of affairs that is at the core of authoritarianism. The democracy-promoting effects of associations and their activities include developmental effects (e.g. the development of general individual political skills and attitudes such as public speaking), public-sphere effects (e.g. the exertion of influence on public opinion in various ways), and institutional effects (e.g. the representation of interests or resistance to planned or taken decisions, see Warren 2001: 142-205 ).
Turning to our understanding of associations, we understand such organisations from a theoretical perspective as part of the whole societal-political complex and of societal conflicts, all of which constitute the state. Associations are thus themselves the site of societal conflicts, are part of specific practices of state power exertion, and can also contribute to the maintenance of state power. But they can also change these practices, insofar as their actions are not one-sidedly and mechanistically determined by the economic base, because states are "constantly contested projects" and because a "state per se is characterised by compromise" (Sauer 2011: 134, our translation We use the term "associations" instead of "civil society organisations" because, first, the former term does not imply any assumptions concerning their civil-society-like characteristics and/or whether and which associations have civil-society-action-like qualities (for such an approach see Wischermann 2010; . In fact, whether the term civil society organisations should be applied to certain societal organisations (e.g. to mass organisations in Algeria or Vietnam) is very much contested. By using the term "association" we avoid taking sides in this discussion. Second, the term "association" has neither a "democratic" nor any other connotation, and since our approach is fundamentally open to various outcomes -associations can be supporters of democracy and/or autocracies -using this term seems more appropriate. Third, from a research-pragmatic perspective, the term "association" is politically neutral and thus facilitates empirical research on this topic in countries under authoritarian rule. Our basic assumption, stemming not only from functionalist theoretical approaches and concepts but also from the fundamentals of relational sociology, is that associations can be bulwarks of democracy, supporters of autocracies, and even both at the same time. Associations are "polyvalent" (Kößler 1994 power. The first form of state power we address is infrastructural power, which denotes the "logistics of political control" (Mann 1984: 192) . It includes two specific forms of such controlnamely, "control through welfare provision" and "control through limited participation" (see below). The second form of state power we are concerned with is discursive power -that is, the "power employed by agents of the state through/on discourse" (Göbel 2011: 188, fn. 7) .
Discursive power denotes the state's control of societal discourse and the shaping of understandings of political issues, historical events, etc.
In our research we analyse the interdependent and reciprocal relations between associations and forms of state power with respect to one specific issue and in three policy fields:
First, we focus on intra-organisational decision-making. Assuming that the state wants to exert control over the society in general and over associations in particular, it might seek to influence the latter's decision-making processes regarding, for example, their activities and the selection of leading personnel. However, associations may seek to deny the state influence in their intra-organisational decision-making.
Second, we focus on welfare policy. We assume that the state aims to exert control over the society by providing welfare services and that it utilises associations in this regard. Associations can be instrumental in reaching specific groups of vulnerable and disadvantaged people living in "problem areas." At the same time, the state aims to maintain a very significant role in this policy field. Therefore, we examine the role of the state in this field and associations' position vis-à-vis this role. We explore whether associations support state policies and practices in this policy field and/or whether they offer criticism. In other words, we explore whether and to what extent the state exerts "control through welfare provision," and how associations react to these attempts. In concrete terms, we concentrate on HIV/AIDS prevention and the care of people living with HIV/AIDS. This life-threatening disease became a pandemic in the early part of this century, no longer confined to marginal(ised) social groups. Even authoritarian rulers decided that something had to be done against the further spread of HIV/AIDS and they gave associations a role in the fight against the disease.
Third, we focus on economic policy, especially the promotion of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs specific ways of interaction and institutionalisation" (Sauer 2001: 166-167 , our translation).
We examine whether associations support the state discourse and policies in this field and/or whether they offer criticism of and develop alternatives to this discourse.
Based on our empirical findings we seek to answer the question, in our conclusion, of whether associations help to maintain and/or weaken these various forms of state power. A "weakening" of the infrastructural or discursive power of the authoritarian state occurs when associations' actions support the development of citizens' individual and collective self-determination and autonomy. Such forms of state power are, on the other hand, "maintained" when associations' actions negate and deny such self-determination and autonomy is denied and negated -a negation that is at the core of authoritarianism.
In an operational sense, the "maintenance" of infrastructural and discursive state power is said to take place if and when -there is an unquestioning acceptance of authoritarian and authoritarianism-promoting state-determined political structures and rules on the associations' side;
-associations present policies which contribute to limiting and negating the individual and collective self-determination of citizens;
-associations relinquish political forms and contents that present alternatives to the dominant politics and policies of the state;
-associations support state discourses relating to gender norms that are suitable for decreasing the power, social status, and recognition of women.
The "weakening" of infrastructural and discursive state power is said to take place if and when -associations aim and/or help to set up state structures and rules which are bound to promote the autonomy and self-determination of citizens;
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self-determination and autonomy;
-associations formulate counter-positions and actively engage in the political and societal discourse surrounding gender norms in ways that are apt to increase the power, raise the social status, and support the recognition of women.
Methodological Issues
The research in all three countries took place in two stages. In stage one we explored the im- The qualities of associations that promote authoritarianism or that help to weaken authoritarianism -and closely connected to this, promote democracy -were identified through "pattern matching" and are based on the criteria mentioned at the beginning of this section.
Associations and the Infrastructural Power of the State
In all three countries the state directly or indirectly influences intra-organisational decisionmaking processes within associations. And in all three countries the state directly or indirectly influences the selection of associations' activities and, in particular, leading personnel. 5 In 4 See the appendix for an anonymised list of all interviews cited in this paper. Almost all the associations interviewed exhibit a concentration of power in the hands of the president or a director. NGOs and Islamic associations usually show a similar concentration of power in the hands of individual leaders, and changes in the leading personnel do not take place often. Since most associations are dependent on the state in terms of moneymostly in the form of annual financial allocations, called "subventions annuelles" -and other forms of state support, they might be willing to adapt their activities according to the state's aims and purposes.
In Mozambique, personal relationships with and close ties to the ruling FRELIMO party often have a decisive impact on the election of associations' leading personnel and their choice of activities. As in Algeria, the majority of associations are hierarchically structured.
Leading persons from FRELIMO and from the state influence associations' internal decisionmaking processes. Even if associations pretend to be democratically structured, upon closer inspection it becomes evident that many decisions are taken in advance of decision-making processes and that many decision-making processes are structured in an informal way.
In Vietnam, the impact of the state on all types of associations is strong. The representatives of various mass organisations, professionals' organisations, and business organisations adhere to and apply various principles of "democratic centralism." This implies, for example, that a small group of people or even a single person makes prior decisions, that the principle 6 Again, in Algeria some independent labour unions (syndicats autonomes) represent an exception to this rule. A difference between decision-making within the Communist Party, the state, and associations is not discernible when it comes to the application of the principle that the minority follows the opinion of the majority after a decisive vote: "Once consensus is reached, everyone must be committed to follow. If someone is not satisfied, he/she must still 'follow the masses' [the collective strength]." 7 Almost all the association representatives interviewed saw reaching consensus as the ultimate goal of decision-making processes. There are, however, "outliers" with respect to intra-organisational decision-making processes. For example, the Hanoi-based NGO 5 does not appear to succumb to the power of the Vietnamese state, the Communist Party, and the organisational principles related to state and party. The NGO experiments with an "acting director regime" and the idea and practice of "project holders" -two mechanisms that seem suited to weakening at least some forms of intra-organisational authoritarianism.
Infrastructural Power as "Control through Welfare Provision"
Our empirical evidence varies concerning the interdependencies between associations and the state in the public welfare sector -concretely, in the realm of HIV/AIDS prevention and the provision of care for people living with HIV (PLWHIV In Algeria the interviewed associations in this policy field generally support the state and state policies. They are engaged within the realm of state programmes and their aim is to contribute to the realisation of the aims the state defines. The organisations conduct awareness-raising and prevention activities, and one of them does so in the framework of a larger awareness-raising programme on sexual and reproductive health.
The pursuit of rights-based approaches and the aim of making PLWHIV autonomous are highly contested among associations in Algeria: NGO 1 pursues something akin to a rightsbased approach. The organisation's representative even emphasised that the main aim of the NGO is to make PLWHIV "autonomous" in the personal, social, and financial sense of the term. NGO 1 does not, however, encourage the formation of community-based organisations and self-help groups. Rather, it supports PLHWHIV to regularly attend their treatments and take advantage of all the state-run healthcare services available to them. To help its beneficiaries become economically self-reliant, the NGO engages in micro-credit activities, most of which are ultimately financed by the state. Based on its activities and experiences, the organisation also contributes to the formulation of the state's national strategic plan on HIV/AIDS. They have gained more room to manoeuvre. The associations interviewed pursue a rightsbased approach, though they do not use this expression. In their activities they focus mainly on awareness-raising with regard to HIV/AIDS, but they also promote self-help and support the development of networks of affected individuals and/or groups. The approaches used by associations offer individuals and groups of affected people opportunities to acquire the skills to lead a more self-determined and autonomous life. While international donors can and do provide Mozambican associations with funds without going through state channels, the state seems to have retained substantial supervisory power in this policy field.
In Vietnam the state's impact on associations working in the policy field of HIV/AIDS prevention and care provision for PLWHIV seems to be much stronger than is the case in Mozambique. To a varying extent and degree, the involvement of associations in state programmes (and, thus, their dependency on state funding) impacts the activities these organi- Some Vietnamese NGOs use rights-based approaches, pursuing the aim of self-empowerment of PLWHIV and other social minority members; support the development of citizens'
individual and collective self-determination and autonomy; and help present alternatives to the dominant politics and policies. However, the NGO representatives interviewed made it clear that if they pursue such activities, this happens in an indirect way and without explicit critique of state politics and policies.
Infrastructural Power as "Control through Limited Participation"
In terms of interdependencies between the state and associations working in the realm of economic policies, especially the promotion of SMEs (Vietnam and Mozambique) and the promotion of private enterprises (Algeria), in all three countries the state invites certain associations to help improve the quality of the economic policies it pursues. Associations can participate in meetings with various state officials in various fora, but their representatives are excluded from those places where the "real" power resides. The representatives and associations involved enjoy various privileges. They are co-opted by the state and they support the state and state policies in this policy field.
In the case of Algeria, various types of associations are invited to provide expertise and advice to the state during law-and policymaking processes. Several of the associations interviewed were allowed to provide such input. They were, however, largely unable to single out which of their policy recommendations have really been adopted by the state (e.g. through incorporation in formal legal documents). Furthermore, these associations had no access to those committees and venues where the decisions were ultimately taken.
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Notably, all the associations interviewed on this issue accepted this exclusion, stating that it was the responsibility of the state and not of associations to decide upon laws and policies. In doing so, the associations explicitly reaffirmed and legitimated the role of the state as the prime actor in law and policy decision-making processes (at least in this policy field). According to a representative of Algerian Business Organisation 1, this organisation does not strive to gain access to the decision-making committees and venues because it is "legalistic" in its stance and therefore accepts that it is the parliament and the state executive who are the decision makers. Concurrently, Business Organisation 1, the interviewee said, can make policy proposals, but taking the final decisions on laws and policies is simply not the task of an entrepreneurs' association. As Business Organisation 2's representative elaborated, even if they do not like a law or policy passed by the state, they nevertheless have to accept and apply it afterwards, not least because they have been involved in its formulation as well: "I have participated in preparing the couscous, so I have to eat it, whether I like it or not."
Algerian associations involved in economic law-and policy-formulation processes refrain from criticising the state openly and are co-opted by various means, such as the allocation of material resources (e.g. in the form of rents), the provision of comparative advantages vis-à-vis other social actors (e.g. information advantages over other entrepreneurs), or a very strong personal relationship between leading personnel and leading representatives of the Algerian state. The strategy of co-opting entrepreneurs' associations appears to form part of a larger state strategy of concentrating the representation of certain social sectors in the hands of co-opted associations, which serve as exclusive channels for transmitting the demands of these social sectors to the state. The determination of which association represents a particular social sector, however, usually remains in the hands of the state.
In Mozambique, professionals' and business organisations are invited or allowed to participate in policymaking processes concerning SME promotion. Both types of associations are involved in formal and informal consultation processes with state representatives. These processes take a variety of forms, including official platforms (e.g. public-private dialogue, direct talks, meetings, invitations, seminars, etc.). Both types of associations appear to abstain from activities intended to create public pressure -for example, strikes. In Vietnam, the impact that this kind of infrastructural power has on associations leads to intense cooperation between the state and certain professionals' and business organisations.
Our interviews suggest that this cooperation benefits mainly, but not exclusively, the state.
The interviews with representatives from Business Organisations 2 and 3 and Professionals'
Association 1 show not only that these organisations accept the political structures and the state's invitation to work within those structures, but also that they are strongly engaged in helping improve the SME-promotion policies that are formulated and adopted within those structures.
Over time, these organisations have gained a favourable position in these policy-formulation processes, and the state has rewarded them in various ways for their contribution to In Algeria, many secular associations working in the field of gender portray the participation of women in the political sphere as a major step towards the modernisation of society.
They thus, albeit perhaps unintentionally, echo the official discourse of the Algerian state.
These associations thus help to legitimise the Algerian state or at least the discourses it pursues. Secondly, while many secular associations would still like to go further, the state has given in to many demands articulated by associations and has reformed several laws relating to women's rights, such as the criminal code and the family code. This allows the state to portray itself as responsive to pressure from the secular women's rights movement. Finally, many secular associations have accepted that they must work within the legal and discursive framework established by the state as far as the personal status law for women is concerned.
Rather than advocating the complete abrogation of the family code, they have begun acting pragmatically and are lobbying for an amendment of the code. They are thus reinforcing the well-known "duality" imposed by the Algerian state with regard to women's rights: while women's participation in the public and political spheres is encouraged, women continue to be considered minors in various realms of private and family life. There are, however, a few NGOs (such as Algerian NGO 3) and other secular associations affiliated with leftist opposition forces which refuse to work within the state's legal and discursive framework and openly advocate for the complete abrogation of the family code.
Secular associations' explicit and implicit support for the state's discourse and policies in the field of gender can mostly be traced back to the existing polarisation between secular and Islamist forces. While many secular associations would like to see more progress as far as the reform of many laws relating to women's rights is concerned, they still opt to cooperate with 295/2016 GIGA Working Papers the authoritarian state because they prefer the current authoritarian but largely secular political system over that which would exist if the Islamist opposition were to obtain power. This allows the state to use the secular middle class in general and the secular women's rights movement in particular to weaken the Islamist opposition as its political rival.
In Mozambique, associations support FRELIMO's discourse of "equality and emancipation," which stems from the time of the one-party regime, and which is also expressed in the existing quota system for political positions within the ruling FRELIMO party. As in Algeria,
Mozambican associations also stress the role that women played in the liberation struggle against the colonial regime. However, these associations criticise the fact that the official policy of gender equality is contradicted by (male) state representatives -for example, those who, in the proposal for the revised penal code defended paragraphs such as that stipulating the exemption of a rapist from prosecution if he married the woman in question. With respect to this code, the associations have helped to have alterations, such as the decriminalisation of abortion, included. They have also created public pressure through marches that ultimately led to the withdrawal of some of the paragraphs that violated women's rights. Some association representatives also criticise the gap between official gender policies promoting "equality and emancipation" and the state's acceptance of a minor role for women in private life.
In Vietnam, one segment of the associations, especially Mass Organisation 3, generally supports the state's gender equality and women's rights policies, whereas some NGOs both support and criticise state policies, especially those concerning marriage equality and the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people. NGOs support, for example, a complete ban of domestic violence and the idea that "housework be considered an incomegenerating job." Relevant legal clauses regarding both issues figure in the 2014 Marriage and Family Law. Still, associations criticise missing definitions and other clauses in the law and in other related laws (e.g. a clear definition of forced sex and sexual violence). The issue of same-sex marriage has given rise to strong principle-based differences between Mass Organisation 3 and the majority of National Assembly members and state and party representatives on the one hand, and certain NGOs on the other. The fundamentally divergent views concern the concepts and underlying understanding of gender, gender norms, and gender relations.
The NGOs interviewed do not share Mass Organisation 3's biologistic and essentialist understanding of gender and they reject one general type of gender system. For example, NGO 5 "moves past the male-female gender binary." At the same time, NGO 5 sees "men and women, gays and lesbians, etc. as elements of a whole. And in doing so, it becomes important that, regardless of who someone is, s/he has a right to be treated equally."
Associations and Their Effects on State Power
In this section we discuss what our findings imply for the maintenance and weakening of various forms of state power. As noted above, the "weakening" of the infrastructural and GIGA Working Papers 295/2016 discursive power of the authoritarian state means support for the development of citizens'
individual and collective self-determination and autonomy; the "maintenance" of such sources of power means that the negation of self-determination and autonomy receives support. To assess the qualities of associations, we refer to the four above-mentioned patterns of authoritarianism and to the patterns which help us to identify democracy-promoting effects.
As regards the state's infrastructural power and its links to intra-organisational decisionmaking processes, the associations interviewed by us tend to succumb to this form of power in all three countries. The state's and/or the state ruling party's interference in internal decision-making processes is widely accepted, or at least not openly rejected. Thus, authoritarian and authoritarianism-promoting, state-determined structures are accepted, if not enforced. associations' use of the "minority-follows-majority" mechanism after a decision is taken. 8 Finally, at least in the case of Vietnamese and Algerian associations, we observe a certain lack of tolerance of views that diverge from the group's own, and at least implicitly a certain rejection of difference and intra-organisational pluralism. In other words, in most associations we observe characteristics of intra-organisational authoritarianism, in the sense that individual and collective self-determination and the autonomy of the individual are severely restricted, if not completely negated.
In terms of intra-organisational decision-making processes, some individual skills and attitudes (e.g. public speaking), and perhaps some virtues (reciprocity, trust, and self-respect),
conducive to the development of democracy might be acquired in associations in all three countries, though this occurs only to a certain extent. But associations do not teach how and when to strike a compromise and they do not aid the acquisition of critical thinking abilities, particularly the ability to deal with conflicts and criticism. This suggests that most associations are not organisations where citizens learn and practise democratic ideas and acquire virtues conducive to the development of democracy. That said, there were exceptions to this rule among the NGOs we interviewed -for example, the Hanoi-based Vietnamese NGO 5.
With respect to the infrastructural power of the state in terms of "control through welfare provision," most if not all the Algerian and Vietnamese associations dealing with HIV/AIDS 8 "But it is a groupiness that generally comes from wanting to be part of some collective, not from identification with a particular group; that originates in wanting self and others to conform to some system, not in commit- weaken this specific form of state power. This might imply that they contribute to creating a variety of democracy-promoting effects, such as the cultivation of virtues conducive to the development of democracy, carrying out roles and responsibilities that enable the increased participation of affected people and enhancing state agencies' responsiveness towards these people.
As regards infrastructural power in terms of "control through limited participation," our findings suggest that the business and professionals' associations interviewed in all three countries help maintain this specific form of state power. Of critical importance is the associ- which in turn leads to the co-optation of those associations taking part in policy formulation.
In a general sense, the strategy of inviting professionals' and business associations can be seen as part of the state's attempt to concentrate the representation of certain social sectors in the hands of selected associations, which serve as exclusive channels for transmitting the demands of these social sectors to the state.
This strategy seems to be most pronounced and most successfully applied in Algeria and these organisations represent a minority. In terms of intra-organisational decision-making, then, the "dark sides" of associations clearly outweigh associationalism's potential "bright sides." The associations concerned "reaffirm, legitimize and reproduce elements of authoritarian structures" (Lewis 2013: 328) and can in this sense be labelled supporters of authoritarian rule.
With respect to "control through welfare provision," the first form of state infrastructural power addressed in the paper, we have found that associations in Algeria and Vietnam help maintain such power, whereas associations in Mozambique have the potential to weaken it.
The widespread thesis that service-oriented associations tend to be apolitical and leaning to- and active hostility to cooperation and collaboration" (Banks/Hulme 2012: 6) and that their role vis-à-vis the state is a contested one. In other words, the role of associations is "far more complex than that proposed by the liberal democratic view, and concomitantly, by those donors bent on funding NGOs in order to build a strong civil society" (Mercer 2002: 19) . Notwithstanding such criticism of donors, our findings suggest that donors' funding of Mozambican associations engaged in HIV/AIDS prevention and care provision for PLWHIV has helped local associations widen their room to manoeuvre and enabled them to weaken the Mozambican state's "control through welfare provision" in this particular policy field. 9
As regards the second form of infrastructural state power addressed above, "control through limited participation," our conclusion is unambiguous: The professionals' and business associations interviewed in all three countries help maintain this form of state power.
This finding contradicts the expectations still held by many practitioners of international development cooperation. We suggest that the fundamental material and/or non-material interests of such organisations need to be taken more carefully into account. What also needs to be understood is that many authoritarian regimes have the means to pacify such organisations and to keep them under the state's thumb without the use of force. The cases of professionals'
and business organisations in Algeria, Mozambique, and Vietnam illustrate the ability of the 9 In this study we have not explored the related thesis that Mozambican (and other countries') associations' close proximity to and high dependence on donors leads these associations to compromise their grass-roots orientation, innovativeness, accountability, autonomy, and legitimacy (Edwards and Hulme 1996; Banks and Hulmes 2012: 11). (Gerschewski 2013; Wiktorowicz 2000) . Moreover, our findings suggest that the co-optation of associations contributes to the persistence of a variety of autocracies and not only of competitive authoritarian regimes as Giersdorf and Croissant (2013: 4) argue.
With respect to the discursive power of the state, our findings show that associations in all three countries help maintain the state's discursive power in the field of gender equality and women's rights -though this happens in various ways and to varying extents. In all three countries at least some NGOs help weaken this form of state power. And it is in this policy field that we find associations which are both supporters of a specific form of state power and forces which help to weaken specific forms of state power. The role of some Vietnamese NGOs in the gender-related discourse and the discourse on the rights of LGBT people serves as a case in point. That the state does not harshly repress those activities contradicts at least in part Lewis's thesis that "authoritarian states have become adept at restricting NGOs to roles commensurate with self-organization, while severely restricting discursive activities" (Lewis 2013: 337) . In Algeria, Vietnam, and Mozambique, association activities that are critical of the state's discourse on gender norms, gender relations, and the rights of sexual minorities are possible. This is all the more astonishing because the exertion of discursive power by the state in the form of a sustained influence on gender norms and gender relationships is "a central component in the field of state hegemony, as state discourses produce hegemonic masculinity and gender hierarchy" (Sauer 2001: 166-167, our translation) . Further research should explore whether associations' opportunities to weaken this form of state power reflect the specifics of the "gender" policy field or a relative "weakness" of this form of authoritarian state power (in comparison to forms of infrastructural power), or both.
In more general terms, our findings suggest that there is not one particular type of association which, without further qualification, helps weaken authoritarian state power. Nor do all types of associations help maintain all forms of authoritarian state power. Our research also demonstrates that studies of associations should not start from the assumption that such organisations are either supporters of democracy or supporters of authoritarian rule. It is more fruitful to see associations as fundamentally "polyvalent" (Kößler 1994) . Our research demonstrates the usefulness of a theoretically grounded, power-focused, and relational perspective for empirical analyses of the roles played by associations under authoritarian rule.
Using such an approach helps focus autocracy research on the state, society, and, more importantly, the complex relations and interactions between the two.
